The purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of the consideration of simultaneous occurrence of seismically induced events in Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) such as failures of components due to seismic stress, seismically induced fire, and seismically induced internal flooding in seismic probabilistic safety assessment(PSA). The seismic risk is estimated in terms of the Core Damage Frequency (CDF) and the CDF is comprised of occurrence frequencies of accident sequences. In this study, two analytical methods, upper bound approximation (UBA) using minimal cut sets (MCSs) and direct quantification of fault tree using Monte Carlo simulation (DQFM) are selected for comparison. The results showed that the simultaneous occurrence of seismically induced events should be reasonably considered to assess the intersection and the union of these events. In addition, the Great Eastern Japan Earthquake and the Tsunami damaged NPPs on the Pacific Coast of Eastern Japan on March 11, 2011 will be examined in this study.
Introduction
Nuclear power plants (NPPs) are facilities that convert thermal power generated by nuclear fission reactions into electric power. The nuclear fission reaction generates fission products that radioactive. The radioactive materials in the reactor core of an NPP could be harmful to the health of people around the site of the NPP when released to the environment. To assess the potential risk and consequence due to damage to the reactor core, PSA has been conducted for many NPPs in the world since WASH-1400 1 was
reported.
The risk of core damage is classified under the risk due to events in NPPs and the risk due to events from the outside of NPPs. The latter includes seismic risk due to earthquake at or around the sites for NPPs. The seismic risk is assessed using the external events PSA. Since many NPPs are on the Pacific Ring of Fire, seismic PSA has been conducted to evaluate the seismic risk in terms of core damage frequency (CDF) for these NPPs [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] .
system SECOM2 (Seismic Core Melt frequency Evaluation Code, version 2) was developed [10] [11] for this purpose. A part of the SECOM2 code system became available to the public as the SECOM2-DQFM (Direct Quantification of Fault tree using Monte Carlo simulation) code 12 .
CDF has been analyzed in detail via accident sequences analysis and importance analysis. The outcomes of these analyses are to understand vulnerable points in the plant, and to take measures to mitigate vulnerable points through changes in the operating procedures and the plant design. SECOM2-DQFM was expanded to enable accident sequence analysis, then the result was compared to the result by upper bound approximation (UBA) method using Minimal Cut Sets (MCSs), and the effect of overestimation was examined in detail. 13 However, general buildings and structures tend to have fire more often in the condition after an earthquake than under normal conditions. Since the conditional occurrence probability of fire might be higher than usual, the fire occurrence mechanism and the consequence have been analyzed [14] [15] . For NPPs, the conditional occurrence probability of fire would be lower than that for the general buildings because of the design for fire protection, but the conditional occurrence probability would be higher due to a seismic event than that for normal conditions. Actually, fire and internal flooding were seismically induced at the NPPs in the Kashiwazaki Kariwa site when the Niigataken Chuetsu-oki earthquake in 2007 threatened the site. In this study, failures of components due to seismic stress, seismically induced fire, and seismically induced internal flooding are integrated in one seismic PSA model to assess the risk due to simultaneous failure events. In addition, analytical methods, DQFM and UBA, are applied to the integrated model. Furthermore, the Great Eastern Japan Earthquake had a very severe impact on NPPs on the Pacific Coast of Eastern Japan on March 11, 2011 . After the earthquake, the seismically induced tsunami caused significant damage to the NPPs. We will account for this event in this study.
acceleration of the component due to potential seismic ground motion. Capacity of the component is a measure of the strength of the component in response to the acceleration. The response and the capacity are used to calculate failure probability of the component. When the response of the component (R) exceeds the capacity of the component (S), probability of component failure, P f is expressed as follows,
where R and S are assumed to be distributed log-normally, the medians are R m and S m , and the corresponding standard deviations are β R and β S . β R is called uncertainty of the response, and β S is called uncertainty of the capacity. When a new variable Z = S / R is introduced, Z could also be distributed log-normally. Z m , the median of Z and β Z , the standard deviation of Z are expressed by the following equation,
Pf can be calculated by the following equation using error function,
where α is acceleration at the component due to seismic ground motion, R m (α) and Pf(α) are the functions of α, and Erf(x) is the error function as follows.
( )
Analytical Methods for Conditional System Failure Probability
In general, system failure can be represented and evaluated by using a Fault Tree (FT) which consists of logic gates and basic events (i.e. which model component failure modes) in the PSA model. In the internal event PSA, probability of system failure is usually calculated once. But in the seismic PSA, probability of system failure is calculated for each level of seismic ground motion since the probability of component failure changes depending on the seismic ground motion as described above. Therefore, the probability is conditional on the seismic ground motion.
There are three general methods to calculate the conditional probability of system failure. The first method is based on the truth table 16 . The exact probability of system failure is obtained by this method. But the combination of all events (i.e. success or failure) in the truth 
where k is the number of MCSs, P(MCSi) is the probability for i-th MCS, τ is all the combinations for selecting 2 MCSs from all of the MCSs. The Eq. (6) is called rare event approximation which simply sums up the probabilities of MCSs. But the probability by this equation is an overestimation since the intersections between MCSs are counted repeatedly. The Eq. (7) considers the subtractions of the intersections between 2 events, and is called Hunter's upper bound approximation. The Eq. (8) is the generic Upper Bound Approximation (UBA), which considers the subtractions of the intersections between all events from the summation. The last general method is based on Monte Carlo simulation. One of the methods, DQFM method 11 is used in this study for comparison with the UBA method. The calculation procedure for occurrence probability of top event by DQFM method is shown in Figure 1 . The exact probability of system failure can be obtained by DQFM method as well as the methods using a truth table. There is an error caused by the generation of random numbers, but the error can be reduced by increasing the number of iterations as with the other methods using Monte Carlo simulation. In this study, the DQFM method is used, and the UBA method is examined in the Section 4.2 for the comparison purpose.
Occurrence Probability of Accident Sequences
In general, Accident sequences are defined using event trees. There are a few methods to calculate occurrence probability of accident sequences. For example, the occurrence probability of an accident sequence is calculated by multiplying conditional split fractions which are obtained with the conditions of success or failure at earlier branches on the path of the accident sequence in the event tree. This method is called the event tree linking (ETL). In another method called the fault tree linking (FTL), Boolean algebra for an accident sequence is obtained by the logical combination of fault trees for all branches on the path of the accident sequence in the event tree.
In this study, the FTL method is used for accident sequence analysis. For example, Boolean algebra is used to obtain MCSs in UBA method. MCSs are commonly composed of only failure events and there are no success events in MCSs. But for seismic PSA, success probability of a seismic impacted event is not close to 1.0 since failure probability of such an event sometimes increases to almost 1.0 as seismic ground motion increases. For this reason, we multiplied the success probabilities for each of the success branches (i.e. 1.0 -failure probabilities) to the occurrence probability of the accident sequence. However, DQFM method uses Boolean algebra to define an accident sequence instead of evaluating the top event of fault tree in Fig. 1 . The Boolean algebra expression of the accident sequence is obtained by the logical combination of failures and successes (i.e. not failures) of fault trees for all branches in the path of the accident sequence in the event tree.
Occurrence Frequency of Accident Sequences
In seismic PSA, the seismically induced frequency of an event is calculated from the conditional occurrence probability of the event and seismic hazard (frequency). The objective event can be the result of system failure, an accident sequence, core damage, etc. When the objective event is set to an accident sequence, the occurrence frequency of the accident sequence ASF is obtained by two variables as follows,
where α is the level of seismic ground motion, ASP(α) is the conditional occurrence probability of the accident sequence at the level α, H(α) is seismic hazard expressed as the annual frequency of exceedance, which means the frequency of the seismic ground motion exceeding the level.
Model Description

Hypothetical Plant and Site in Model
The objective of this study is to estimate the risk of a nuclear power plant by the simultaneous consideration of several causes of core damage, and not to estimate the seismic risk at specific NPP. In this study, we use a plant model which was the same as that used for seismic PSA study of the Model plant 9 . This model simulates a 1100MWe BWR5 plant with Mark-II type containment, one of the most popular types of NPP in Japan. The NPP is assumed to be located at a site on the Pacific coast of the northeastern area of Japan.
The parameters such as responses, capacities, random failure probabilities, and seismic hazard curve in the Model plant are also applied to this study.
Expansion of Integrated Fault Tree
Five initiating events, i.e. RPV (reactor pressure vessel) rupture, large LOCA (loss of coolant accident), medium LOCA, small LOCA, LOSP (loss of offsite power) were considered in this model. All these initiating events are treated in the integrated fault tree to estimate the total CDF as shown in Fig. 2 . One of the initiating events, RPV rupture is assumed to lead directly to core damage. The safety mitigation systems such as ECCSs (emergency core cooling systems) are available for the other 4 initiating events to prevent core damage. The example of the integrated fault tree for LOSP is shown in Fig. 3 . The fault tree is modeled so that the core damage is induced by the simultaneous occurrence of LOSP and the failure of the safety mitigation functions. The safety mitigation functions are provided by three groups of systems, i.e. systems for reactor trip, systems for coolant injection, and systems for residual heat removal. HPCS (high pressure core spray system) is one of the systems for the coolant injection function as shown in Fig. 4 . The fault tree initially includes component failures due to seismic response (i.e. stress) and random failure in the HPCS as front line system and those in the supporting systems such as EPSs (emergency power supply systems) and component cooling water systems. The parameters for component failures (i.e. random failure probability, design response and capacity) used in this study are the same as those used in the Model plant. In this study, the fault tree model is expanded to include seismically induced fire and internal flooding as shown in Fig. 4 . The conditions to model these additional events are described in the next section.
Consideration of Seismically Induced Fire and Internal Flooding
The sources of fire and internal flooding are assumed to be the components that have already been considered in the Model plant. Fire and internal flooding are generated based on the same response and the same capacity that were applied for the functional failures directly due to the seismic ground motion. But all of failures are assumed to be induced independently.
The sources of fire are assumed to be circuit breakers for alternating current (AC) power supplies, i.e. switchgears, power centers, and motor control centers, and components containing light oil such as diesel generators and the day tanks. Two fire fighting pumps are added in the Model plant to prevent the failure of each of the equipment due to local fire spreading. Two fire fighting pumps are assumed to be available to extinguish all sources of fire. In other words, the system failure is induced by the occurrence of fire generation from the local fire source and the simultaneous failure of the two fire fighting pumps. The response for the fire pumps is assumed to be the same as the response for the seawater pumps. But the seismic capacity of the fire pumps is reduced by half of the seismic capacity for the seawater pumps since the quake-resistance class of the fire pumps is assumed to be lower than that of the seawater pumps.
The sources of internal flooding are assumed to be the pumps in systems such as HPCS, RCIC, LPCI, LPCS, RHR, RHR component cooling water system (RHRC), and RHR seawater system (RHRS). Although pipes and tanks could be the sources of internal flooding, these sources are assumed to be represented by the pumps. The flow at the leak path from the source of internal flooding is assumed to be sufficiently small that it would not cause the failure of the system directly, but the leak flow could induce a malfunction of motors for pumps or valves in the system if there is no protection against the soaking of the motors in a pump room. It is assumed that a drain pump in the pump room is available to prevent the soaking of the motors. It is also assumed that there are protective measures to prevent direct splashing from the leak path to the equipment motors and hence prevent the malfunction of the equipment. Each pump room has one drain pump to remove leak water. In other words, the system failure is induced by the occurrence of internal flooding from the leak path and the simultaneous failure of one drain pump. The response for the drain pumps is assumed to be the same as the leaking pumps (i.e. the sources of internal flooding), but the seismic capacity of the drain pump is reduced by half of the seismic capacity for the leaking pumps, because the quake-resistance class of the drain pumps is assumed to be lower than that of the leaking pumps.
Classification According to Cause of Core Damage
Using the integrated fault tree shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 as the basis, the fault tree is expanded to consider fire and internal flooding as shown in Fig 4 based on the calculation condition described in the Section 3.3. CDF is calculated using the integrated and expanded fault tree. In addition, CDF is classified into some accident sequences by the causes of core damage to see the effect of the consideration for internal flooding and fire. The event tree to define the accident sequences is shown in Fig. 5 . The first heading in the event tree is occurrence of core damage due to all causes considered in the model. The heading is linked to the integrated fault tree shown in Fig. 2 . In other words, the sum of the accident sequence frequency that fails at the first heading is CDF. Two headings following the first heading are provided to distinguish accident sequences on which the core damage is induced only by internal flooding, fire, or both of them. The accident sequences through the success branches at both headings are classified at an additional two headings to separate them if they include system failure due to internal flooding or fire, or not. For example, the accident sequence "CD" in Fig. 5 does not include any system failures due to internal flooding or fire. 
Results
CDF Classified by Causes of Core Damage
First, the results for three models are compared. The first model (Model A) includes only direct seismic damage. Then, damage due to seismically induced internal flooding is added to Model A in the second model (Model B). Furthermore, damage due to seismically induced fire is added to Model B in the last model(Model C). The calculated conditional core damage probability for the three models is shown in Fig. 6 . The conditional core damage probability increases as the additional causes are considered. The difference between Model A and Model B (that is, the effect of considering seismically induced internal flooding) is greater than the difference between Model B and Model C (that is, the effect of considering seismically induced fire). There are reasons for the difference in the effects, a major one being that there are two fire fighting pumps available for fire while only one drain pump for internal flooding is available in one pump room as described in the Section 3.3.
The following analysis is basically based on Model C. Classification of conditional core damage probability using the event tree in Fig. 5 is as follows. As the seismic ground motion increases, system failures due to seismically induced internal flooding and fire result in much higher conditional occurrence probability of the event than that due to system failure as a result of direct seismic response. This is shown as CDA and CDB, respectively in Fig. 7 . The conditional system failure probability as represented by CDAB increases even more due to simultaneous occurrence of seismically induced internal flooding and fire. As the seismic ground motion increases, core damage caused by seismically induced internal flooding and fire occurs and the core damage occurrence probability (represented by CDX and CDY, respectively) increases, and finally core damage occurrence probability represented by CDXY could be significant since all causes of core damage simultaneously occur. The conditional core damage probability is over 0.9 at 1200 Gal.
The conditional core damage probability can be translated into conditional core damage frequency after the seismic hazard frequency is considered, as shown in Fig. 8 . Though the conditional core damage probability is about 1.0 at 1200 Gal as described above, the conditional core damage frequency is relatively small since the seismic hazard frequency at such seismic ground motion is small. After the seismic hazard frequency is considered, Fig. 7 is converted into Fig. 9 . Based on the seismic hazard at the Model plant 9 , the peak of the conditional core damage frequency is at around 600 Gal. Since the conditional core damage frequency is small at higher ground motion level, core damage due to seismically induced internal flooding and fire become more inconspicuous. Occurrence frequencies of accident sequences integrated for all seismic ground motion are shown in Table 1 . Table 1 Total core damage frequency The CDF due only to seismically induced internal flooding (A) is 4.5% of the total CDF based on the assumption in this study. (A) is equivalent to CDF estimated using a model in which only seismically induced internal flooding is considered. In the same manner, the CDF due only to seismically induced fire (B) is 1.5% of the total CDF. (B) is equivalent to CDF estimated using a model in which only seismically induced fire is considered. (A) and (B) is much smaller than that due to the simultaneous occurrence of all seismically induced failures (i.e. (D)). (D) could be classified in more detail as shown in Table 2 . Table 2 Breakdown of (D) in Table 1 (D1) is the CDF caused by the component/system failures due only to seismic response, and it does not include system failures due to seismically induced internal flooding and fire. (D2) is the CDF with the system failures due to seismically induced internal flooding, and the frequency is over four times greater than that for (A) which is the CDF due only to internal flooding. At the same time, (D3) that is the CDF with system failures due to seismically induced fire, is more than twice as large as (B) which is the CDF due only to fire. Table 3 shows the CDF estimated for Model A, B, and C, which is how CDF increases by considering seismically induced internal flooding and fire. The total CDF increases by 17% when considering internal flooding and fire. In other words, 15% (= 17%/(100%+17%)) of the total CDF for Model C is contributed at least partially by seismically induced internal flooding or fire. However, the summation of (A) and (B) is only 6% as shown in Table 1 . It means that the increase of the CDF by considering internal flooding and fire simultaneously with the component failures directly due to seismic response is larger than the summation of CDF estimated only for the single cause. In this study, the CDF due only to seismically induced internal flooding or fire is small but the contribution by the simultaneous consideration of seismically induced internal flooding and fire to the total CDF is significant and can not be neglected.
The conditional occurrence probability of the accident sequences based on UBA method is shown in Fig. 10 for comparison with Fig. 7 based on DQFM method. The conditional core damage probability should not exceed 1.0, however, the results shown in Fig. 10 has the conditional core damage probability exceeds 1.0 at peak acceleration greater than 800 Gal because of the overestimation of UBA method. The accident sequence frequency is integrated for all seismic ground motion based on the result in Fig. 10 as follows. The result using DQFM method is also shown for the comparison. Table 4 Comparison of accident sequence frequency between UBA method and DQFM method
The total CDF using UBA method is 1.5 times greater than that using DQFM method. Each frequency of the accident sequence is not equally overestimated. The degrees of overestimation are different depending on the accident sequences. As a result, the ranking of accident sequences is different between UBA and DQFM method.
Effect of Tsunami Consideration
The event tree in Fig. 5 is modified to consider a seismically induced tsunami as shown in Fig. 11 . In this study, it is assumed that all safety mitigation systems is not expected to work against a tsunami over a certain design basis, and the occurrence of a tsunami leads to core damage directly. In the event tree, the accident scenario with a tsunami is modeled as an independent accident sequence since it is expected that a tsunami is essentially different from the other causes in impacting safety mitigation systems. The occurrence mechanism of a tsunami over the design basis has not been clarified completely yet and it can be obtained from future research and analysis. In this study, the two following simplified cases are assumed for conditional occurrence probability of a tsunami for the trial analysis. The former case (Case T1) assumed that a tsunami over the design basis would occur once per 100 times of earthquakes occurrences, and the occurrence would not depend on strength of seismic ground motion (i.e. the occurrence probability would be always 0.01). The latter case (Case T2) assumed that a tsunami over the design basis would not occur with small seismic ground motion, but seismic ground motion stronger than 500 Gal (the peak ground acceleration was recorded at Fukushima-daiichi NPPs on March 11, 2011 19 ) would induce the tsunami at all times (i.e. it is step function and the interval is 500 Gal). The occurrence frequencies of accident sequences for these cases are shown as the following table. Table 5 shows that the accident sequence frequency due to a tsunami over the design basis is the most dominant contribution to the total CDF for both cases.
The results in Table 5 were re-examined as a trial analysis in this study. For example, Case T2 is an extreme case that represents the situation in Fukushima-daiichi NPPs deterministically. Essentially, the conditional occurrence probability of the tsunami could not be zero at small seismic ground motion since significant seismic ground motion due to Great Chilean Earthquake on May 22, 1960 was not felt or detected on the other side of the Pacific Ocean but the induced tsunami did 20 . In addition, if the seismic ground motion is large but the epicenter is not in the ocean, it would be hard to cause a tsunami. The result in Table 5 only implies that if tsunami over a certain design basis would lead the plant to core damage directly, the CDF due to the tsunami must be a main contributor of the total CDF.
Conclusions
In this study, the causes of core damage such as seismically induced internal flooding and fire are combined with failure directly due to seismic response into one integrated model, and the seismic CDF is analyzed based on the integrated model. The results showed that even if the CDF estimated for a single cause is small, the total CDF for multiple causes can be much larger than the summation of the CDF for each individual cause. In the reliability analysis, if one cause is noticed, analysts tend to focus on it in general. But once an earthquake occurs, many components are damaged and lose their function simultaneously due to multiple causes. In this study, the authors suggest estimating risk impact due to all cause in one integrated model.
The results also show that it is important to choose the appropriate method among the analytical methods available even in the integrated model, and the impact on the CDF is significant as shown in the former study 13 .
However, a seismically induced tsunami was considered and incorporated into the model for a trial analysis. The results showed that the CDF due to a seismically induced tsunami is a dominant contributor to the total CDF if the safety systems could not be protected from damage from a tsunami over design basis and the tsunami leads the plant directly to core damage.
In the future, it is expected that the actual accident situation at the Fukushima-daiichi site will be revealed little by little by further investigation, the condition obtained with the investigation will be analyzed both deterministically and probabilistically in detail, and the result from the analysis could be used to create measures against another accident situation. Actually, tide embankments are planned to built on the coast, emergency diesel generators are planned to put in elevated areas, and seawater pumps that remove residual heat are planned to reinforce against tsunamis in the other sites after the accident. The heat removal system by natural circulation designed in the fourth generation reactors could be one of the valid safety systems against tsunamis. The authors hope that tsunamis can be dealt on the same basis as the other causes, based on such measures in near future.
